
Requirements:



 $\frac{-\text{Binding: for all adversaries A, if <math>\sigma \leftarrow \text{Setup}$, then $\Pr\left[(m_0, m_1, c, \pi_0, \pi_1) \leftarrow A : m_0 \neq m, \text{ and } \text{Verify}(\sigma, c, m_0, \pi_0)^{-1} \in \text{Verify}(\sigma, c, m_1, \pi_1)\right]^{-1} = \text{Negl}$

A ZK protocal for graph 3-coloring: contains a nodes, m edges ___prover (G) verifier (G) o ← Setup (12) - let K: E {0,1,2} be a 3-coloring of G - choose random permutation T ← Perm[{0,12}] -for i E [n]: $(c_{i,\pi_{i}}) \leftarrow Commi+ (\sigma, \tau(k))$ c.,..., Cn (i, j) 😤 E for random r: 65 -reject if (1,j) ∉ E $(\tau(k_{i}), \pi_{i}), (\tau(k_{i}), \pi_{i})$ K{ κ' > accept if Ki = K; and Ki, Kj E {0,1,2} Verify (σ , ci, k; π ;) = 1 = Verify (σ , cj, Kj, π ;) reject otherwise

Intuitively: Prover commits to a coloring of the graph Verifier challenges prover to reveal coloring of a single edge Prover reveals the coloring on the chosen edge and opens the entries in the commitment

<u>Completeness</u>: By inspection [if coloring is valid, prover can always answer the challenge correctly]

except with prob. |- negl.

Soundness: Suppose G is not 3-colorable. Let K1,..., Kn be the coloring the prover committed to. If the commitment scheme is statistically binding c,..., cn uniquely determine K,..., Kn. Since G is not 3-colorable, there is an edge (i.j.) E E where Ki=Kj or i & {0,1,23 or j & {0,1,23. [Otherwise, G is 3-colorable with coloring K1,..., Kn.] Since the verifier chooses an edge to check at random, the verifier will choose (isj) with probability /IEI Thus, if G is not 3-colorable, Pr[verifier rejects] > TET

Thus, this protocol provides soundness $1 - \frac{1}{1E1}$. We can repeat this protocol $O(|E|^2)$ times sequentially to reduce sound ress error to $\Pr\left[\text{verifier accepts proof of fake statement}\right] \leq \left(1 - \frac{1}{|E|}\right)^2 \leq e^{-|E|} = e^{\pi c} \left[\text{since } |+ x \leq e^{x}\right]$

Zero Knowledge: We need to construct a simulator that outputs a valid transcript given only the graph G as input. Construct simulator S as fullows: Let V* be a (possibly malicious) verifier. 1. Run V* to get 0*.

- 2. Choose K: ~ {0,1,25 for all if [n].
- Simulator does not know coloring so it commits to a random one Let (c;,n;) Commit (0*, K;)
- Give (c1,..., Cn) to V*.
- 3. V* outputs an edge (i.j) E E
- 4. If Ki ≠ Kj, then S outputs (Ki, Kj, π;, πj).
 - Otherwise, restart and try again (if fuils 2 times, then abort)

Simulator succeeds with probability 3 (over choice of K1,..., Kn). Thus, simulator produces a valid transcript with prob. 1- 3/3 = 1- negl(2) after & attempts. It suffices to show that simulated transcript is indistinguishable from a real transcript.

- Real scheme: prover opens Ki, Kj where Ki, Kj = 8 Eo.1,23 [since prover randomly permutes the colors]

- Simulation: K; and Kj sampled uniformly from 30,1,23 and conditioned on K; = Kj, distributions are identical In addition, (1, j) output by V* in the simulation is distributed correctly since commitment scheme is computationally-hiding (e.g. V* behaves essentially the same given commitments to a randow coloring as it does given commitment to a valid coloring

If we repeat this protocol (for soundness amplification), simulator simulate one transcript at a time

Summary: Every language in NP has a zero-knowledge proof (assuming existence of PRGs)

PRGs imply commitments