

Focus thus far in the course: protecting communication (e.g., message confidentiality and message integrity)


Remainder of course: protecting computations

Zero-knowledge: a defining idea at the heart of theoretical cryptography
↳ Idea will seem very counter-intuitive, but surprisingly powerful (with surprising implications (DSA/ECDSA signatures based on ZK!))
↳ Showcases the importance and power of definitions (e.g., "What does it mean to know something?")

We begin by introducing the notion of a "proof system"

- Goal: A prover wants to convince a verifier that some statement is true
- e.g., "This Sudoku puzzle has a unique solution"
"The number N is a product of two prime numbers p and q "
"I know the discrete log of h base g "
- } these are all examples of statements

We model this as follows:



Properties we care about:

- Completeness: Honest prover should be able to convince honest verifier of true statements

$$\forall x \in L : \Pr[\pi \leftarrow P(x) : V(x, \pi) = 1] = 1$$

- Soundness: Dishonest prover cannot convince honest verifier of false statement

$$\forall x \notin L : \Pr[\pi \leftarrow P(x) : V(x, \pi) = 1] < \frac{2}{3}$$


Important: We are not restricting to efficient provers

Typically, proofs are "one-shot" (i.e., single message from prover to verifier) and the verifier's decision algorithm is deterministic
↳ Languages with these types of proof systems precisely coincide with NP (proof of statement x is to send NP witness w)

Going beyond NP: we augment the model as follows

- Add randomness: the verifier can be a randomized algorithm
- Add interaction: verifier can ask "questions" to the prover

Interactive proof systems [Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff]:



Set of languages that have an interactive proof system is denoted IP.

Theorem (Shamir): $IP = PSPACE$

languages that can be decided in polynomial space [very large class of languages!]

