Thus far, we have assumed that parties have a shared key. Where does the shared key come from?

Can we do this using the tools we have developed so far?

So far in this course:

OWFs $\Rightarrow$ PRGs $\Rightarrow$ PRFs $\Rightarrow$ CPA-secure encryption, MAC $\Rightarrow$ authenticated encryption

basic building block of symmetric cryptography

Can we show OWFs (or even OWPs) $\Rightarrow$ key agreement?

Key agreement:

Alice $\rightleftarrows$ Bob (messages exchanged back and forth)

Alice $\downarrow$ k_1 Bob $\downarrow$ k_2

Requirements:

1) $k_1 = k_2 = k$ with high probability
2) Eavesdropper cannot learn k (efficiently)

Merkle puzzles: Suppose $f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ is an injective one-way function

$\hookrightarrow$ f is one-way if for all efficient adversaries A,

$$\Pr\left[f(A(f(x))) = f(x) : x \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{X} \right] = \text{negl}.$$

$\hookleftarrow$ A is trying to find preimage of $f(x)$

When f is injective, then this is simply $\Pr[A(f(x)) = x] = \text{negl}.$

Alice   **Bob**

Alice: $x_1, \dots, x_n \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$

Alice $\xrightarrow{y_1 = f(x_1), \dots, y_n = f(x_n)}$ Bob

Bob: $i \xleftarrow{R} [n]$

find x_i such that $f(x_i) = y_i$ [solve the "puzzle"]

derive a key k from x_i

(e.g., using hard-core bit or hash the input) — modeled as random oracle

Alice $\xleftarrow{\text{Encrypt}_{AE}(k, m)}$ Bob

Alice: $\downarrow$ try each key k_i to decrypt ciphertext — k_i derived from x_i

Suppose it takes time t to solve a puzzle. Adversary needs time $O(nt)$ to solve all puzzles and identify key. Honest parties work in time $O(n+t)$.

$\hookrightarrow$ Only provides linear gap between honest parties and adversary

Can we get a super-polynomial gap just using OWFs?   Very difficult! [Impagliazzo-Rudich]

Can we get a super-linear gap just using OWFs?   Very difficult! [Barak-Mahmoody]

$\hookrightarrow$ A positive result will require non-black-box techniques.

Impagliazzo-Rudich: Proving the existence of key-agreement that makes black-box use of OWPs implies $P \neq NP$.

Implication of black-box separations: Constructing secure key agreement will require more than just one-way functions

↳ Distinction between Minicrypt and Cryptomania in "Impagliazzo's five worlds"

We will turn to algebra / number theory for new sources of hardness to build key agreement protocols.

Definition. A group consists of a set $\mathbb{G}$ together with an operation $*$ that satisfies the following properties:

- Closure: If $g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}$, then $g_1 * g_2 \in \mathbb{G}$
- Associativity: For all $g_1, g_2, g_3 \in \mathbb{G}$, $g_1 * (g_2 * g_3) = (g_1 * g_2) * g_3$
- Identity: There exists an element $e \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $e * g = g = g * e$ for all $g \in \mathbb{G}$
- Inverse: For every element $g \in \mathbb{G}$, there exists an element $g^{-1} \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $g * g^{-1} = e = g^{-1} * g$

In addition, we say a group is commutative (or abelian) if the following property also holds:

- Commutative: For all $g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}$, $g_1 * g_2 = g_2 * g_1$

called "multiplicative" notation

Notation: Typically, we will use "$\cdot$" to denote the group operation (unless explictly specified otherwise). We will write g^x to denote $\underbrace{g \cdot g \cdot g \cdots g}_{x \text{ times}}$ (the usual exponential notation). We use "1" to denote the multiplicative identity

Examples of groups: $(\mathbb{R}, +)$: real numbers under addition

$(\mathbb{Z}, +)$: integers under addition

$(\mathbb{Z}_p, +)$: integers modulo p under addition [sometimes written as $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$]

here, p is prime

The structure of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ (an important group for cryptography):

$\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_p : \text{there exists } y \in \mathbb{Z}_p \text{ where } xy = 1 \pmod p\}$

↳ the set of elements with multiplicative inverses modulo p

What are the elements in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$?

greatest common divisor

<u>Bezout's identity</u>: For all positive integers $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$, there exists integers $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $ax + by = \gcd(x, y)$.

<u>Corollary</u>: For prime p, $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, \ldots, p-1\}$.

<u>Proof.</u> Take any $x \in \{1, 2, \ldots, p-1\}$. By Bezout's identity, $\gcd(x, p) = 1$ so there exists integers $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ where $1 = ax + bp$.
Modulo p, this is $ax = 1 \pmod p$ so $a = x^{-1} \pmod p$.

Coefficients a, b in Bezout's identity can be efficiently computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm:

<u>Euclidean algorithm</u>: algorithm for computing $\gcd(a, b)$ for positive integers $a > b$:
relies on fact that $\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, a \pmod b)$:
to see this: take any $a > b$
↳ we can write $a = b \cdot q + r$ where $q \geq 1$ is the quotient and $0 \leq r < b$ is the remainder
↳ d divides a and b $\Longleftrightarrow$ d divides b and r
↳ $\gcd(a, b) = \gcd(b, r) = \gcd(b, a \pmod b)$

gives an explicit algorithm for computing gcd: repeatedly divide:

$\gcd(60, 27)$:

$$\begin{aligned} 60 &= 27(2) + 6 & [q = 2, r = 6] &\rightsquigarrow \gcd(60, 27) = \gcd(27, 6) \\ 27 &= 6(4) + 3 & [q = 4, r = 3] &\rightsquigarrow \gcd(27, 6) = \gcd(6, 3) \\ 6 &= 3(2) + 0 & [q = 2, r = 0] &\rightsquigarrow \gcd(6, 3) = \gcd(3, 0) = 3 \end{aligned}$$

"rewind" to recover coefficients in Bezout's identity:

extended Euclidean algorithm
$$\left\{ \begin{aligned} 60 &= 27(2) + 6 \\ 27 &= 6(4) + 3 \\ 6 &= 3(2) + 0 \end{aligned} \right. \longrightarrow 3 = 27 - 6 \cdot 4$$

$$6 = 60 - 27(2)$$

$$27 - (60 - 27(2))4 = 27(9) + 60(-4)$$

coefficients

<u>Iterations needed</u>: $O(\log a)$ – i.e., bit-length of the input [worst case inputs: Fibonacci numbers]

<u>Implication</u>: Euclidean algorithm can be used to compute modular inverses (faster algorithms also exist)

cyclic groups are commutative

defined to be the identity element

Definition. A group $\mathbb{G}$ is cyclic if there exists a generator g such that $\mathbb{G} = \{g^0, g^1, \ldots, g^{|\mathbb{G}|-1}\}$.

Definition. For an element $g \in \mathbb{G}$, we write $\langle g \rangle = \{g^0, g^1, \ldots, g^{|\mathbb{G}|-1}\}$ to denote the set generated by g (which need not be the entire set. The cardinality of $\langle g \rangle$ is the order of g (i.e., the size of the "subgroup" generated by g)

↳ means that $g^{\text{ord}(g)} = 1$

Example. Consider $\mathbb{Z}_7^* = \{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$. In this case,

$\langle 2 \rangle = \{1,2,4\}$ [2 is not a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_7^*$] $\text{ord}(2) = 3$

$\langle 3 \rangle = \{1,3,2,6,4,5\}$ [3 is a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_7^*$] $\text{ord}(3) = 6$

Lagrange's Theorem. For a group $\mathbb{G}$, and any element $g \in \mathbb{G}$, $\text{ord}(g) \mid |\mathbb{G}|$ (the order of g is a divisor of $|\mathbb{G}|$).

↳ For $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, this means that $\text{ord}(g) \mid p-1$ for all $g \in \mathbb{G}$

Corollary (Fermat's Theorem): For all $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $x^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$

Proof. $|\mathbb{Z}_p^*| = |\{1,2,\ldots,p-1\}| = p-1$

By Lagrange's Theorem, $\text{ord}(x) \mid p-1$ so we can write $p-1 = k \cdot \text{ord}(x)$ (for integer k) and so $x^{p-1} = (x^{\text{ord}(x)})^k = 1^k = 1 \pmod{p}$

Implication: Suppose $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and we want to compute $x^y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ for some large integer $y \gg p$

↳ We can compute this as

$$x^y = x^{y \pmod{p-1}} \pmod{p}$$

since $x^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$

↳ Specifically, the exponents operate modulo the order of the group

↳ **Equivalently:** group $\langle g \rangle$ generated by g is isomorphic to the group $(\mathbb{Z}_q, +)$ where $q = \text{ord}(g)$

$$\langle g \rangle \cong (\mathbb{Z}_q, +)$$

$$g^x \mapsto x$$

Notation: g^x denotes $\overbrace{g \cdot g \cdots g}^{x \text{ times}}$

g^{-x} denotes $(g^x)^{-1}$ [inverse of group element g^x]

$g^{x^{-1}}$ denotes $g^{(x^{-1})}$ where x^{-1} computed mod $\text{ord}(g)$ — need to make sure this inverse exists!

Computing on group elements: In cryptography, the groups we typically work with will be large (e.g., 2^{256} or 2^{1024})

- Size of group element (# bits): $\sim \log |\mathbb{G}|$ bits (256 bits / 2048 bits)
- Group operations in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$: $\log p$ bits per group element

addition of mod p elements: $O(\log p)$

multiplication of mod p values: naively $O(\log^2 p)$

Karatsuba $O(\log^{1.71} p)$

Schönhage-Strassen (GMP library): $O(\log p \log\log p \log\log\log p)$

best algorithm $O(\log p \log\log p)$ [2019]

↳ not yet practical ($> 2^{4096}$ bits to be faster...)

exponentiation: using repeated squaring: $g, g^2, g^4, g^8, \ldots, g^{\lceil \log p \rceil}$, can implement using $O(\log p)$ multiplications [$O(\log^3 p)$ with naive multiplication]

↳ time/space trade-offs with more precomputed values

division (inversion): typically $O(\log^2 p)$ using Euclidean algorithm (can be improved)