


Succinct Functional Commitments for Circuits from k -Lin

Hoeteck Wee and David Wu

June 2024

Functional Commitments



Functional Commitments



$\text{Commit}(\text{crs}, x) \rightarrow (\sigma, \text{st})$

Takes a **common reference string** and commits to an **input x**

Outputs commitment σ and commitment state st

Functional Commitments



$\text{Commit}(\text{crs}, x) \rightarrow (\sigma, \text{st})$

$\text{Open}(\text{st}, f) \rightarrow \pi$

Takes the commitment state and a function f and outputs an opening π

$\text{Verify}(\text{crs}, \sigma, (f, y), \pi) \rightarrow 0/1$

Checks whether π is valid opening of σ to value y with respect to f

Functional Commitments




Correctness: if $(\sigma, st) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(\text{crs}, x)$ and $\pi \leftarrow \text{Open}(st, f)$
then $\text{Verify}(\text{crs}, \sigma, (f, f(x)), \pi) = 1$

Can open commitment to x to value $y = f(x)$ for any function f

Functional Commitments



Binding: efficient adversary **cannot** open σ to two different values with respect to the **same** f



Functional Commitments




Succinctness: commitments and openings should be short

- **Short commitment:** $|\sigma| = \text{poly}(\lambda, \log |x|)$
- **Short opening:** $|\pi| = \text{poly}(\lambda, \log |x|)$


Special Cases of Functional Commitments

Vector commitments:




commit to a vector, open at an index

Polynomial commitments:



commit to a polynomial, open to the evaluation at x

Commitments as Proofs on Committed Data



π is a proof that the data satisfies some property
(e.g., committed input is in a certain range)

Succinctness: both the commitment and the proof are short

Succinct Functional Commitments

(not an exhaustive list!)

Scheme	Function Class	Assumption
[Mer87]	vector commitment	collision-resistant hash functions
[LY10, CF13, LM19, GRWZ20]	vector commitment	q -type pairing assumptions
[CF13, LM19, BBF19]	vector commitment	groups of unknown order
[PPS21]	vector commitment	short integer solutions (SIS)
[KZG10, Lee20]	polynomial commitment	q -type pairing assumptions
[BFS19, BHRRS21, BF23]	polynomial commitment	groups of unknown order
[CLM23, FLV23]	polynomial commitment	k - R -ISIS assumption (lattices)
[LRY16]	linear functions	q -type pairing assumptions
[ACLMT22, CLM23]	constant-degree polynomials	k - R -ISIS assumption (lattices)
[LRY16]	Boolean circuits	collision-resistant hash functions + SNARKs
[dCP23]	Boolean circuits	SIS (non-succinct openings in general)
[KLVW23]	Boolean circuits	batch arguments for NP
[BCFL23]	Boolean circuits	twin k - R -ISIS (lattice) / HiKER (pairing)
[WW23a, WW23b]	Boolean circuits	ℓ -succinct SIS

Pairing-Based Functional Commitments

This work: functional commitments for **general circuits** using **pairings**

Why bilinear maps? Schemes have the best **succinctness**

- Pairing-based SNARKs just have a constant number of group elements

*Can we construct a functional commitment for general circuits where the size of the commitment and the opening contain a **constant** number of group elements?*

Namely: match the succinctness of pairing-based SNARKs, but only using standard pairing-based assumptions (no knowledge assumptions or ideal models)

Pairing-Based Functional Commitments

This work: functional commitments for **general circuits** using **pairings**

Scheme	Function Class	$ \text{crs} $	$ \sigma $	$ \pi $	Assumption
[LRY16, Gro16]	arithmetic circuits	$O(s)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	generic group
[LRY16]	linear functions	$O(\ell)$	$O(1)$	$O(m)$	subgroup decision
[LM19]	linear functions	$O(\ell m)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	generic group
[LP20]	μ -sparse polynomials	$O(\mu)$	$O(m)$	$O(1)$	über assumption
[CFT22]	degree- d polynomials	$O(\ell^d m)$	$O(d)$	$O(d)$	ℓ^d -Diffie-Hellman exponent
[BCFL23]	arithmetic circuits	$O(s^5)$	$O(1)$	$O(d)$	hinted kernel (q -type)
[KLVW23]	arithmetic circuits	$\text{poly}(\lambda)$	$O(1)$	$\text{poly}(\lambda)$	k -Lin
This work	arithmetic circuits	$O(s^5)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	bilateral k-Lin

ℓ = input length, m = output length, s = circuit size

metrics in # group elements

This Work

This work: functional commitments for **general circuits** using **pairings**

Scheme	Function Class	$ \text{crs} $	$ \sigma $	$ \pi $	Assumption
This work	arithmetic circuits	$O(s^5)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	bilateral k -Lin

- First pairing-based construction for general **circuits** based on **falsifiable** assumptions where commitment and openings contain **constant** number of group elements
 - **Previously:** needed SNARKs (non-falsifiable assumptions)
- First scheme that only makes **black-box** use of cryptographic primitives/algorithms where the commitment + opening size is $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ bits
 - **Previously:** need non-black-box techniques (e.g., SNARKs or BARGs for NP)

This Work

This work: functional commitments for **general circuits** using **pairings**

Scheme	Function Class	$ crs $	$ \sigma $	$ \pi $	Assumption
This work	arithmetic circuits	$O(s^5)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	bilateral k -Lin

Constant number
of group elements

Additional implications (for free!):

- SNARG for P/poly with a **universal** setup with constant-size proofs (CRS only depends on the size of the circuit)
 - **Previously (from pairings):** SNARG for P/poly with circuit-dependent CRS [GZ21]
- Homomorphic signature for general (bounded-size) circuits with constant-size signatures
 - **Previously (from pairings):** Signature size scaled with the *depth* of the circuit [BCFL23]

(all results without relying on knowledge assumptions or ideal models)

Starting Point: Chainable Commitment

Chainable commitment [BCFL23]


Let $f: \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^d$ be a vector-valued function

Can think of commitment as a subset product:

$$\sigma = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} h_i^{x_i}$$


where h_i are in the CRS

succinct commitment to vector \mathbf{x}



σ_x

succinct opening π



σ_y

Instead of committing to \mathbf{x} and opening to $\mathbf{y} = f(\mathbf{x})$



Open to **commitment** to $\mathbf{y} = f(\mathbf{x})$

Chain binding: cannot open σ_{in} to two distinct commitments $\sigma_{\text{out}}, \sigma'_{\text{out}}$


succinct commitment to vector $\mathbf{y} = f(\mathbf{x})$

Starting Point: Chainable Commitment

Chainable commitment for **quadratic functions** \Rightarrow functional commitment for **circuits**

[BCFL23]

Assume: each gate computes quadratic function



Starting Point: Chainable Commitment

Chainable commitment for **quadratic functions** \Rightarrow functional commitment for **circuits**


[BCFL23]

Commitment: σ

Opening: $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_3, \pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3)$

Opening scales with
depth of circuit

Commit to
input wires



Commitments to internal
layers and output layer



Chainable commitment openings for each layer

Our Approach: Commit to All Wires


Goal: Constant number of group elements for commitment **and** openings

Commitment: (same as before)

Verifier know output (z_1, \dots, z_d) :




Opening: commit to **all** wires (i.e., concatenated together) **twice**



Our Approach: Commit to All Wires

Goal: Constant number of group elements for commitment **and** openings

Commitment: (same as before)





Verifier know output (z_1, \dots, z_d) :



Opening: commit to all wires (i.e., concatenated together) twice


Everything is short, but how do we argue binding?




Our Approach: Commit to All Wires

Goal: Constant number of group elements for commitment **and** openings


Commitment: (same as before)



Verifier know output (z_1, \dots, z_t) :




Opening: commit to **all** wires (i.e., concatenated together) **twice**




Neither σ_1 nor σ_2 is a quadratic function of σ_{input}

With bilinear maps, we only know how to check quadratic functions



Approach Overview



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




Initially: no guarantees on what $\sigma_1, \sigma'_1, \sigma_2, \sigma'_2$ commit to



Cannot use chain binding to argue that σ_1 and σ'_1 are equal since they are not a quadratic function of σ_{in}

Our approach: argue that a **prefix** of σ_1, σ'_1 are still equal

Approach Overview



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




Initially: no guarantees on what $\sigma_1, \sigma'_1, \sigma_2, \sigma'_2$ commit to



Input consistency: π, π' includes an opening that asserts that the first ℓ components of σ_1, σ'_1 are consistent with σ_{in}

Approach Overview



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




Close to a chain binding property: prover is opening σ_{in} to output commitments σ_1, σ'_1

Caveat: Only reasoning about the first ℓ components of σ_1 and σ'_1 (*not* the entire vector)

Input consistency: π, π' includes an opening that asserts that the first ℓ components of σ_1, σ'_1 are consistent with σ_{in}

Approach Overview



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$



σ_1, σ'_1

If we establish that the first ℓ components of σ_1, σ'_1 agree, we can try to argue that the first $\ell + 1$ components of σ_2, σ'_2 also agree




σ_2, σ'_2

corresponds to a single gate

Observation: first $\ell + 1$ components of σ_2, σ'_2 is a quadratic function of the first ℓ components of σ_1, σ'_1

Approach Overview



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




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Approach Overview




Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$



Repeat this process: if σ_2, σ'_2 agree on the first $\ell + 1$ values, then σ_1, σ'_1 agree on the first $\ell + 1$ values

Approach Overview




Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$





Repeat this process: if σ_2, σ'_2 agree on the first $\ell + 1$ values, then σ_1, σ'_1 agree on the first $\ell + 1$ values

Approach Overview




Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$



Iterate to conclude that σ_1, σ'_1 actually agree on **all** values (including the outputs), which implies binding

Approach Overview




Main technical tool: way to reason about **prefixes** of a committed vector

Prove statements of the following form:

- **Input consistency:** first ℓ wires in σ_1 is consistent with σ_{in}
- **Gate consistency:** first $j + 1$ wires in σ_2 is consistent with first j wires in σ_1
- **Internal consistency:** first j wires in σ_1 is consistent with first j wires in σ_2
- **Output consistency:** last t wires in σ_1 are consistent with σ_{out}

Projective Chainable Commitments



Intuitively: can associate CRS with an index j that allows projecting a commitment σ_1 onto a commitment to the first j indices


Projective chain binding: given $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \pi')$

If $\text{Project}(\text{td}, \sigma_1, j) = \text{Project}(\text{td}, \sigma'_1, j)$ and

- (σ_2, π, f) is a valid opening for σ_1
- (σ'_2, π', f) is a valid opening for σ'_1

Then, $\text{Project}(\text{td}, \sigma_2, j+1) = \text{Project}(\text{td}, \sigma'_2, j+1)$

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




Initially: no guarantees on what $\sigma_1, \sigma'_1, \sigma_2, \sigma'_2$ commit to



Step 1: **Input consistency** between σ_{in} and σ_1, σ'_1

Projective chain binding: σ_1, σ'_1 are both openings for σ_{in} so $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell)$

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$



σ_1 and σ'_1 **agree** on first ℓ components:
 $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell)$


Note: we do **not** know what values they have, only that they agree



Step 1: **Input consistency** between σ_{in} and σ_1, σ'_1

Projective chain binding: σ_1, σ'_1 are both openings for σ_{in} so $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell)$

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$



σ_1 and σ'_1 **agree** on first ℓ components:
 $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell)$


Note: we do **not** know what values they have, only that they agree



Step 2: **Gate consistency** between first ℓ wires in σ_1, σ'_1 with first $\ell + 1$ wires in σ_2, σ'_2

Since $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell)$, projective chain binding implies $\text{Project}(\sigma_2, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_2, \ell + 1)$

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




σ_2 and σ'_2 agree on first $\ell + 1$ components:
 $\text{Project}(\sigma_2, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_2, \ell + 1)$



Step 2: Gate consistency between first k wires in σ_1, σ'_1
with first $\ell + 1$ wires in σ_2, σ'_2

Since $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell)$, projective chain binding implies $\text{Project}(\sigma_2, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_2, \ell + 1)$

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




σ_2 and σ'_2 agree on first $\ell + 1$ components:
 $\text{Project}(\sigma_2, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_2, \ell + 1)$



Step 3: Internal consistency between first $\ell + 1$ wires in σ_2, σ'_2 with first $\ell + 1$ wires in σ_1, σ'_1

Since $\text{Project}(\sigma_2, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_2, \ell + 1)$, projective chain binding implies $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell + 1)$

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




σ_1 and σ'_1 agree on first $\ell + 1$ components:
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Step 3: Internal consistency between first $\ell + 1$ wires in σ_2, σ'_2 with first $\ell + 1$ wires in σ_1, σ'_1

Since $\text{Project}(\sigma_2, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_2, \ell + 1)$, projective chain binding implies $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell + 1)$

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$




σ_1 and σ'_1 agree on first $\ell + 1$ components:
 $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell + 1)$





Observe: we have established that $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell + 1)$

Can iterate this strategy for each index $\ell + 1, \ell + 2, \dots$ to argue that σ_1, σ'_1 agree on **all** components

Using Projective Chainable Commitments




Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$





Observe: we have established that $\text{Project}(\sigma_1, \ell + 1) = \text{Project}(\sigma'_1, \ell + 1)$

Can iterate this strategy for each index $\ell + 1, \ell + 2, \dots$ to argue that σ_1, σ'_1 agree on **all** components

Using Projective Chainable Commitments



Consider two different openings: $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_{\text{out}}, \pi)$ and $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \sigma'_{\text{out}}, \pi')$



If $\sigma_1 = \sigma'_1$, then final output commitment check ensures $\sigma_{\text{out}} = \sigma'_{\text{out}}$

Similar proof strategy as [GZ21, CJJ21, KLVW23]

Constructing Projective Chainable Commitments

Starting point: Kiltz-Wee [KW15] proof system for proving membership in linear spaces

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Let $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ be a pairing group and let g be a generator of \mathbb{G}

Common reference string contains two vectors $g^{\mathbf{t}}$ and $g^{\hat{\mathbf{t}}}$ where $\mathbf{t} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell$ and $\hat{\mathbf{t}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^d$

Vector \mathbf{t} is used to commit to the inputs and vector $\hat{\mathbf{t}}$ is used to commit to outputs

Commitment to input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell$ is $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{\mathbf{t}^\top \mathbf{x}}$

Commitment to output $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d$ is $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{y}}$

Basically a Pedersen (vector) commitment:
if $g^{\mathbf{t}} = [h_1, \dots, h_\ell]$, then $\sigma = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} h_i^{x_i}$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Commitment to input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell$ is $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{\mathbf{t}^\top \mathbf{x}}$ Commitment to output $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d$ is $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{y}}$

To support openings to the linear function \mathbf{M} ($\mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x}$), we also include in the CRS $g^{\mathbf{z}^\top}$ where

$$\mathbf{z}^\top = w\mathbf{t}^\top - r\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \quad \text{and} \quad r, w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Intuitively: \mathbf{z} “recodes” an input commitment with respect to \mathbf{t} to an output commitment with respect to $\hat{\mathbf{t}}$

Commitment to output $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d$ is $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{\mathbf{t}}^T \mathbf{y}}$

To support openings to the linear function $(\mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x})$, we also include in the CRS $g^{\mathbf{z}^T}$ where

$$\mathbf{z}^T = w\mathbf{t}^T - r\hat{\mathbf{t}}^T \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \quad \text{and} \quad r, w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Commitment to input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell$ is $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{\mathbf{t}^\top \mathbf{x}}$ Commitment to output $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d$ is $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{y}}$

To support openings to the linear function \mathbf{M} ($\mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x}$), we also include in the CRS $g^{\mathbf{z}^\top}$ where

$$\mathbf{z}^\top = \mathbf{w}\mathbf{t}^\top - r\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \quad \text{and} \quad r, \mathbf{w} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

For now, we consider the **designated-verifier** setting where **secret key** needed to check proofs

Opening: $\pi = g^{\mathbf{z}^\top \mathbf{x}}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\mathbf{w}}}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$

Secret verification key: r, \mathbf{w}

Correctness: $\frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\mathbf{w}}}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r} = \frac{g^{\mathbf{w}\mathbf{t}^\top \mathbf{x}}}{g^{r\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{y}}} = \frac{g^{\mathbf{w}\mathbf{t}^\top \mathbf{x}}}{g^{r\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x}}} = g^{(\mathbf{w}\mathbf{t}^\top - r\hat{\mathbf{t}}^\top \mathbf{M})\mathbf{x}} = g^{\mathbf{z}^\top \mathbf{x}} = \pi$

Security for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$

Suppose adversary produces the following:

Input commitment $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^c$

Output commitments $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{c}}, \sigma'_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{c}'}$

Openings $\pi = g^v, \pi' = g^{v'}$

If the openings are valid, then

$$v = wc - r\hat{c}$$

$$v' = wc - r\hat{c}'$$

Thus, $v - v' = r(\hat{c} - \hat{c}')$

Non-zero since $\hat{c} \neq \hat{c}'$

Security for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

Under DDH, wt computationally **hides** value of r

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$

Technically: DDH does not hold in a symmetric pairing group, but can use asymmetric group (or k -Lin)

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$

Distribution of $r(\hat{c} - \hat{c}')$ is pseudorandom from the perspective of the adversary, so this check passes with probability $1/p$

Suppose adversary produces the following:

Input commitment $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^c$

Output commitments $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{c}}, \sigma'_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{c}'}$

Openings $\pi = g^v, \pi' = g^{v'}$

Thus, $v - v' = r(\hat{c} - \hat{c}')$

Non-zero since $\hat{c} \neq \hat{c}'$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$ $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$ $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y}$

Lots of caveats:

Only supports **fixed** functions

Only supports **linear** functions

Only **designated-verifier**

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$ $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$ $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y}$

Caveat: Only supports **fixed** functions

Extend to arbitrary functions by relying on **linear homomorphism**

Suppose we publish $g^{z_1^T} = g^{w_1 t^T - r\hat{t}^T M_1}$ and $g^{z_2^T} = g^{w_2 t^T - r\hat{t}^T M_2}$ in the CRS

$$\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x} \quad g^{\alpha_1 z_1^T x} \text{ is an opening to } \mathbf{y} = \alpha_1 \mathbf{M}_1 \mathbf{x}$$

$$\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y} \quad \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\alpha_1 w_1}}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r} = g^{\alpha_1 w_1 t^T x - r\hat{t}^T y} = g^{\alpha_1 w_1 t^T x - \alpha_1 r\hat{t}^T M_1 x} = g^{\alpha_1 z_1^T x}$$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$ $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$ $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y}$

Caveat: Only supports **fixed** functions

Extend to arbitrary functions by relying on **linear homomorphism**

Suppose we publish $g^{z_1^T} = g^{w_1 t^T - r \hat{t}^T M_1}$ and $g^{z_2^T} = g^{w_2 t^T - r \hat{t}^T M_2}$ in the CRS

$$\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x} \quad g^{\alpha_1 z_1^T x} \text{ is an opening to } \alpha_1 \mathbf{M}_1 \mathbf{x}$$

$$\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y} \quad g^{\alpha_2 z_2^T x} \text{ is an opening to } \alpha_2 \mathbf{M}_2 \mathbf{x}$$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

$$\frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\alpha_1 w_1}}{g^{r \hat{t}^T (\alpha_1 M_1 x)}} = g^{\alpha_1 z_1^T x} \qquad \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\alpha_2 w_2}}{g^{r \hat{t}^T (\alpha_2 M_2 x)}} = g^{\alpha_2 z_2^T x}$$

Caveat: Only supports **fixed** functions

Extend to arbitrary functions by relying on **linear homomorphism**

Suppose we publish $g^{z_1^T} = g^{w_1 t^T - r \hat{t}^T M_1}$ and $g^{z_2^T} = g^{w_2 t^T - r \hat{t}^T M_2}$ in the CRS

$$\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x} \qquad g^{\alpha_1 z_1^T x + \alpha_2 z_2^T x} \text{ is an opening to } \mathbf{y} = \alpha_1 \mathbf{M}_1 \mathbf{x} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{M}_2 \mathbf{x}$$

$$\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T \mathbf{y}} \qquad \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\alpha_1 w_1 + \alpha_2 w_2}}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r} = g^{\alpha_1 z_1^T x + \alpha_2 z_2^T x}$$

Verification relation for
 $\mathbf{x} \mapsto (\alpha_1 \mathbf{M}_1 + \alpha_2 \mathbf{M}_2) \mathbf{x}$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

$$\frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\alpha_1 w_1}}{g^{r\hat{t}^T(\alpha_1 M_1 x)}} = g^{\alpha_1 z_1^T x} \qquad \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^{\alpha_2 w_2}}{g^{r\hat{t}^T(\alpha_2 M_2 x)}} = g^{\alpha_2 z_2^T x}$$

Caveat: Only supports **fixed** functions

Extend to arbitrary functions by relying on **linear homomorphism**

Publish components for complete basis of linear functions

$$\mathbf{M}_{i,j} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \mathbf{1} & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{array}{l} \longleftarrow \text{column } j \\ \uparrow \text{row } i \end{array}$$

Any linear function \mathbf{M} can be expressed as a linear combination of $\mathbf{M}_{i,j}$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$ $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$ $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y}$

Caveat: Only supports **linear** functions

Can extend to quadratic functions by linearization (and tensoring)

Quadratic function of \mathbf{x} is a linear function of $\mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{x}$

[see paper for details]

Prover commits to $\mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{x}$ and evaluates a linear function; certify well-formedness of commitment using pairing

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$ $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$ $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y}$

Caveat: Only **designated-verifier**

Solution: encode the verification key r and w in the exponent (following [KW15])

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string:

Verification relation: Check that

Caveat: Only **designated-verifier**

Previous argument required that r was computationally hidden, so we cannot just give out g^r

Solution: encode the verification key r and w in the exponent (following [KW15])

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$ $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$ $\sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T y}$

Caveat: Only **designated-verifier**

Solution: encode the verification key r and w in the exponent (following [KW15])

Sample $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$

CRS: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{\mathbf{a}}, g^{\mathbf{a}^T \mathbf{w}}, g^{\mathbf{a}^T \mathbf{r}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$

Sample $\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$

Verification relation is now

$$\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x} \quad \sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T Mx} \quad e(g^{\mathbf{a}^T}, \pi) = \frac{e(g^{\mathbf{a}^T \mathbf{w}}, \sigma_{\text{in}})}{e(g^{\mathbf{a}^T \mathbf{r}}, \sigma_{\text{out}})} \quad \pi = g^{wt^T x - r\hat{t}^T Mx}$$

Chainable Commitments for Linear Functions

Suppose we want to support openings to a *fixed* linear function

$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \mapsto \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^d \text{ where } \mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \ell}$$

Common reference string: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$ $\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x}$

Verification relation: Check that $\pi = \frac{\sigma_{\text{in}}^w}{\sigma_{\text{out}}^r}$

In this approach, r has one unit of entropy given $a^T r$, so we can still carry out a similar argument as before

Caveat: Only **designated-verifier**

Solution: encode the verification key r and w into a commitment (commitment scheme)

Sample $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$


CRS: $g^t, g^{\hat{t}}, g^a, g^{a^T w}, g^{a^T r}, g^{wt^T - r\hat{t}^T M}$

Sample $w, r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$

Verification relation is now

$$\sigma_{\text{in}} = g^{t^T x} \quad \sigma_{\text{out}} = g^{\hat{t}^T Mx} \quad e(g^{a^T}, \pi) = \frac{e(g^{a^T w}, \sigma_{\text{in}})}{e(g^{a^T r}, \sigma_{\text{out}})} \quad \pi = g^{wt^T x - r\hat{t}^T Mx}$$

Projective Chainable Commitments



Need a way to project a commitment onto a subset of its components

$$g^t = [h_1, \dots, h_\ell]$$

$$\sigma = g^{t^T x} = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} h_i^{x_i}$$

In **composite-order groups**: introduce a subgroup for components in projection set

Suppose \mathbb{G} has order $N = pq$ and let $\mathbb{G}_p, \mathbb{G}_q$ be the order- p and **order- q** subgroups of \mathbb{G}

Let g_p be a generator of \mathbb{G}_p and g_q be a generator of \mathbb{G}_q

Replace g^t with $h_1 = (g_p g_q)^{t_1}, \dots, h_j = (g_p g_q)^{t_j}, h_{j+1} = g_p^{t_{j+1}}, \dots, h_\ell = g_p^{t_\ell}$

Projective Chainable Commitments

Commitment is now

$$\sigma = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} h_i^{x_i} = \prod_{i=1}^j (g_p g_q)^{t_i x_i} \prod_{i=j+1}^{\ell} g_p^{t_i x_i}$$

If we consider σ in the mod- q subgroup, then

$$\sigma_q = \prod_{i \in [j]} g_q^{t_i x_i}$$

This is precisely a commitment to the first j components!

Need a way to project a commitment onto a subset of its components

$$g^t = [h_1, \dots, h_\ell]$$

$$\sigma = g^{t^T x} = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} h_i^{x_i}$$

In **composite-order groups**: introduce a subgroup for components in projection set

Suppose \mathbb{G} has order $N = pq$ and let $\mathbb{G}_p, \mathbb{G}_q$ be the order- p and **order- q** subgroups of \mathbb{G}

Let g_p be a generator of \mathbb{G}_p and g_q be a generator of \mathbb{G}_q

Replace g^t with $h_1 = (g_p g_q)^{t_1}, \dots, h_j = (g_p g_q)^{t_j}, h_{j+1} = g_p^{t_{j+1}}, \dots, h_\ell = g_p^{t_\ell}$

Projective Chainable Commitments

Commitment is now

$$\sigma = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} h_i^{x_i} = \prod_{i=1}^j (g_p g_q)^{t_i x_i} \prod_{i=j+1}^{\ell} g_p^{t_i x_i}$$

If we consider σ in the mod- q subgroup, then

$$\sigma_q = \prod_{i \in [j]} g_q^{t_i x_i}$$

This is precisely a commitment to the first j components!

Syntactic issue: We were considering linear/quadratic functions over \mathbb{Z}_p before; when using composite-order groups, we should view it as functions over the integers

$i \in [\ell]$

Main idea: embed **two** copies of the chainable commitment scheme:

- The normal scheme is embedded in the \mathbb{G}_p -subgroup
- The projected scheme is embedded in the \mathbb{G}_q -subgroup

When reasoning about chain binding, we implement the previous proof argument within the \mathbb{G}_q subgroup

Projective Chainable Commitments

Commitment is now

$$\sigma = \prod_{i \in [\ell]} h_i^{x_i} = \prod_{i=1}^j (g_p g_q)^{t_i x_i} \prod_{i=j+1}^{\ell} g_p^{t_i x_i}$$

If we consider σ in the mod- q subgroup, then

$$\sigma_q = \prod_{i \in [j]} g_q^{t_i x_i}$$

This is precisely a commitment to the first j components!

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
In paper: use **prime-order groups** and consider two orthogonal subspaces (normal scheme in one subspace and projected scheme in the other); security reduces to (bilateral) k -Lin

[see paper for details; see also [GZ21] for similar projection approach]


Functional Commitments for Circuits

Goal: Constant number of group elements for commitment **and** openings


Commitment:




Verifier know output (z_1, \dots, z_d) :



Opening: commit to **all** wires (i.e., concatenated together) **twice**



Use projective chain binding and
an iterative argument to argue binding



Summary

This work: functional commitments for **general circuits** using **pairings**

Scheme	Function Class	$ \text{crs} $	$ \sigma $	$ \pi $	Assumption
This work	arithmetic circuits	$O(s^5)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	bilateral k -Lin

- First pairing-based construction for general **circuits** based on **falsifiable** assumptions where commitment and openings contain **constant** number of group elements
- First scheme that only makes **black-box** use of cryptographic primitives/algorithms where the commitment + opening size is $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ bits

Open problem: Construction with shorter CRS (e.g., linear-size)? Then, parameters would match state-of-the-art pairing-based SNARKs

Thank you!

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/688>