

**CS378**  
**Autonomous Multiagent Systems**  
**Spring 2004**

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**TA: Mazda Ahmadi**

Department of Computer Sciences  
The University of Texas at Austin

Week 12a: Tuesday, April 13th

# Good Afternoon, Colleagues

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- Go over Gibbard-Satterthwaite
- Can you get around Arrow by weighting preferences?

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- Enough detail so that Mazda or I could reimplement

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  - Slides on resources page

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“You will have to work day and night”

# Class Discussion

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Ryan Hatfield on auctions with time limits

# Voting vs. auctions

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- Auctions: maximize profit
  - result affects buyer and seller
- Voting: maximize social good
  - result affects all

# Gibbard-Satterthwaite

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What about Clarke tax algorithm?

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**Pareto optimality.** If everyone prefers  $X$  to  $Y$ , then the outcome should rank  $X$  above  $Y$ .

**Criterion of independence of irrelevant alternatives.** If one set of preference ballots would lead to an overall ranking of alternative  $X$  above alternative  $Y$  and if some preference ballots are changed without changing the relative rank of  $X$  and  $Y$ , then the method should still rank  $X$  above  $Y$ .

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**Non-dictatorship.** There should not be one specific voter whose preference ballot is always adopted.



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  - e.g. in Borda protocol
- Push-over: Rank someone higher to get someone else elected
  - e.g. in a protocol with multiple rounds

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## Example