

CS395T
Agent-Based Electronic Commerce
Fall 2006

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Week 9b

Good Afternoon, Colleagues

Are there any questions?

Logistics

- CAT discussion

Walras

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 - load balancing, distributed computing, general resource allocation...

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- Equilibrium over expectation vs. expected equilibrium?

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- What is the equilibrium price of this expectation?

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 - Which is more important? (initial vs. interim)?

Class Discussion

- Brian Farrell on centralized vs. distributed control

General Equilibrium vs. game theory

- What is the relationship between Nash Eq. and Gen. Eq.?
- Which is “preferable”?