The only further difficulty related to an agent distinguishing which
messages are intended for it arises in the presence of active
interference. Consider a hostile agent h which hears a message that
is directed to 
at time t. h has full access to the message
since all agents use the same communication channel. Thus if h
remembers the message and sends an identical message at time u,
agent 
will mistakenly believe that the message is from a
teammate. Although the message was appropriate at time t, it may be
obsolete at time u and it could potentially confuse 
as h
intends.
This potential difficulty is avoided with the <encoded-time-stamp> field. Even a simple time stamp is likely to safeguard against interference since h is not privy to the locker-room agreement: it does not necessarily know which field is the time stamp. However, if h discovers which field is the time stamp by noticing that it always matches the time of the message, it could alter the field based on the time elapsed between times t and u. Indeed, if there is a globally accessible clock, h would simply have to replace t with u in the message. However, the team can safeguard against such interference techniques by encoding the time-stamp using an injective function chosen as a part of the locker-room agreement. This function can use any of the other message fields as arguments in order to make decryption as difficult as possible. The only requirement is that a teammate receiving the message can invert the function to determine the time at which the message was sent. If the time at which it was sent is either too far in the past or in the future (according to the locker-room agreement), then the message can be safely ignored. In particular, the locker-room agreement has a variable message-lag-tolerance encoding this time. If a message sent at time t arrives at time u with u-t > message-lag-tolerance, then the message is ignored.
By observing enough messages and comparing them with the actual time, it is theoretically possible for hostile agents to crack simple codes and alter the <encoded-time-stamp> field appropriately before sending a false message. However, the function can be made arbitrarily complex so that such a feat is intractable within the context of the domain. If secrecy is critical and computation unconstrained, a theoretically safe encryption scheme can be used. The degree of complexity necessary depends upon the number of messages that will be sent after the locker-room agreement. With few enough messages, even a simple linear combination of the numerical message fields may suffice.