Learning Optimal Advantage from Preferences and Mistaking it for Reward



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The model of preference

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \frac{\exp[f(\sigma_1)]}{\exp[f(\sigma_1)] + \exp[f(\sigma_2)]}$$
$$= logistic(f(\sigma_1) - f(\sigma_2))$$

(Shorthand notation above leaves out from P and f an implied reward function as input.)



Learning a reward function from preferences

Given a preference model $P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2 | \hat{r})$,



optimize \hat{r} to maximize the likelihood of the *preferences dataset*.

Typical RLHF algorithm's view of the world



Common model: Partial return

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic}\left(\sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_1} r(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_2} r(s,a)\right)$$

Common model: Partial return

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Suboptimal segment



Equal partial return Lower end state value

Optimal segment GOAL

Equal partial return **Higher end state value**



Equal partial return Higher start state value

Optimal segment



Equal partial return
Lower start state value

Common model: Partial return

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Proposed model: Regret

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic} \left(\sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_1} A_r^*(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_2} A_r^*(s,a) \right)$$

The **regret** of a segment **measures how much it deviates from optimal behavior.**

Partial return

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic}\left(\sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_1} r(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_2} r(s,a)\right)$$

Showing reward





Regret

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic} \left(\sum_{(s,a) \in \sigma_1} A_r^*(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a) \in \sigma_2} A_r^*(s,a) \right)$$

Showing optimal advantage





Preferred

Proposed model: Regret

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic} \left(\sum_{(s,a) \in \sigma_1} A_r^*(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a) \in \sigma_2} A_r^*(s,a) \right)$$

Showing optimal advantage





Preferred





Preferred

Proposed model: Regret

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic} \left(\sum_{(s,a) \in \sigma_1} A_r^*(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a) \in \sigma_2} A_r^*(s,a) \right)$$



Theoretically superior (identifiable)

With human preferences

- more descriptive
- learns more aligned reward functions

Then why does the partial return preference model work so well for fine-tuning? Then why does the partial return preference model work so well for fine-tuning?

This paper answers in two contexts:1) RLHF generally2) RLHF fine tuning for LLMs

When regret drives preferences but the dominant model is assumed (i.e., using A_r^* as r)

Outline:

When A^{*}_r is known exactly
When A^{*}_r is approximated
Reframing RLHF for LLMs

Assuming the partial return preference model when regret is correct

(Learning A_r^* and using it as r)

A unified representation of the preference models $P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = logistic(f(\sigma_1) - f(\sigma_2))$

Partial return: $f(\sigma)$ = discounted sum of r(s, a) for each (s, a) in σ Regret: $f(\sigma)$ = discounted sum of $A^*(s, a)$ for each (s, a) in σ Unification: $f(\sigma)$ = discounted sum of g(s, a) for each (s, a) in σ

If you assume partial return but preferences are by regret, then **you are** using (an approximation of) A* as a reward function.

A unified representation of the preference models

 $P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = logistic \left(f(\sigma_1) - f(\sigma_2) \right)$ $= logistic \left(\sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_1|-1} \tilde{r}(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma}) - \sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_2|-1} \tilde{r}(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma})\right) \text{ Partial return}$ $= logistic \left(\sum_{\tilde{r}}^{|\sigma_1|-1} A^*_{\tilde{r}}(s^{\sigma}_t, a^{\sigma}_t) - \sum_{\tilde{r}}^{|\sigma_2|-1} A^*_{\tilde{r}}(s^{\sigma}_t, a^{\sigma}_t)\right) \text{ Regret}$ $= logistic \left(\sum_{i=1}^{|\sigma_1|-1} g(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma}) - \sum_{i=1}^{|\sigma_2|-1} g(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma}) \right) \text{ Unification}$

If you assume partial return but preferences are by regret, then **you are** using (an approximation of) A* as a reward function.

A unified representation of the preference models

$$P(\sigma_{1} \succ \sigma_{2}) = logistic \left(f(\sigma_{1}) - f(\sigma_{2}) \right)$$

= $logistic \left(\sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_{1}|-1} \tilde{r}(s_{t}^{\sigma}, a_{t}^{\sigma}) - \sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_{2}|-1} \tilde{r}(s_{t}^{\sigma}, a_{t}^{\sigma}) \right)$ Partial return
= $logistic \left(\sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_{1}|-1} A_{\tilde{r}}^{*}(s_{t}^{\sigma}, a_{t}^{\sigma}) - \sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_{2}|-1} A_{\tilde{r}}^{*}(s_{t}^{\sigma}, a_{t}^{\sigma}) \right)$ Regret
= $logistic \left(\sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_{1}|-1} g(s_{t}^{\sigma}, a_{t}^{\sigma}) - \sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_{2}|-1} g(s_{t}^{\sigma}, a_{t}^{\sigma}) \right)$ Unification

Dataset created by reward function r and	Algorithm for learning from preferences	Output of learning from preferences	Additional step to create policy (other than greedy action selection)	
partial return preference model	learning g	\hat{r}	policy improvement	$\hat{\pi}_r^*$
regret preference model	learning by regret algorithm	\hat{r}	policy improvement	$\hat{\pi}_r^*$
regret preference model	learning <i>g</i>	\hat{A}_r^*	nothing	$\hat{\pi}_r^*$



Dataset created by reward function \ensuremath{r} and

regret

partial return preference model

regret preference model

regret preference model

Algorithm for learning from preferences

learning g

arning by regret algorithm

arning g

Assumed ,Output of learning

from preferences

 \hat{r}

Additional step to create policy (other than greedy action selection)

policy improvement

policy improvement

nothing

$\hat{\pi}_r^*$ $\hat{\pi}_r^*$ $\hat{\pi}^*$

Dataset created by reward function \ensuremath{r} and

regret

partial return preference model

regret preference model

regret preference model

Algorithm for learning from preferences

learning g

earning by regret algorithm

learning g

Assumed ,Output of learning

from preferences

 \hat{r}

 \hat{A}_r^*

Additional step to create policy (other than greedy action selection)

policy improvement

policy improvement

nothing

$\hat{\pi}_r^*$ $\hat{\pi}_r^*$

 $\hat{\pi}_r^*$

rew	Dataset created by ard function r and	Algorithm for learning from preferences	Assumed _A Output of learning from preferences	Additional step to create policy (other than greedy action selection)	
	regret - partial return - preference model	learning g	\hat{r}	policy improvement ►	$\hat{\pi}_r^*$
۰۔ د	regret preference model	learning by regret algorithm	⊳	policy improvement	$\hat{\pi}_r^*$
	regret preference model	learning <i>g</i>	\hat{A}_r^*	nothing	$\hat{\pi}_r^*$
-			gr	reedy $\widehat{A_r^*}$	



Using A_r^* as reward

Optimal policies are preserved.

The set of optimal policies under r and $r_{A_r^*} \triangleq A_r^*$ is the same, regardless of the discount factor used with $r_{A_r^*}$.

Intuition:

 $egin{aligned} &A_r^*(s,a)=0 \iff (s,a) ext{ is optimal w.r.t. } r \ &A_r^*(s,a)<0 \iff (s,a) ext{ is suboptimal w.r.t. } r \end{aligned}$

SO:

trajectory τ has return = 0 under $r' \iff all (s, a)$ in τ are optimal w.r.t. rtrajectory τ has return < 0 under $r' \iff some (s, a)$ in τ is suboptimal w.r.t. r

Therefore a trajectory gets maximal return under r' iff that trajectory is optimal w.r.t. r.

Reward is highly shaped.

From Ng, Harada, and Russell's 1999 paper on potential-based shaping:

about the domain. As to how one may do this, Corollary 2 suggests a particularly nice form for Φ , if we know enough about the domain to try choosing it as such. We see that if $\Phi(s) = V_M^*(s)$ (with $\Phi(s_0) = 0$ in the undiscounted case), then Equation (4) tells us that the value function in M' is $V_{M'}^*(s) \equiv 0$ — and

With some algebra, we find that this definition of the potential function makes Ng et al.'s shaped reward function $r_{A_r^*} \triangleq A_r^*$, the optimal advantage function with respect to r!

Set $\Phi \triangleq V_r^*$.

An underspecification issue is resolved.

When segment lengths $|\sigma|$ are 1:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\sigma|-1} \gamma^t r(s_t, a_t) = \gamma^0 r(s_0, a_0) = r(s_0, a_0)$$

Affected by the γ in the human's mind?

Preferences training set generated via partial return Reward function learned via partial return The set of optimal policies The choice of γ during policy optimization No No Yes Not without dataset augmentation

However, for $r_{A_r^*} \triangleq A_r^*$,

a trajectory is optimal \iff its discounted sum of $A_r^*(s, a)$ values is 0 so γ has no impact on the set of optimal policies.

Policy improvement wastes computation and environment sampling.

If we have A_r^* , then why do policy improvement to get the same policy as $\pi_r^*(s) = argmax_a A_r^*(s, a)$?

Using \widehat{A}_{r}^{*} , an approximation of A_{r}^{*} , as reward

If the max of $\widehat{A_r^*}$ in every state is 0, behavior is identical between greedy $\widehat{A_r^*}$ and greedy $Q_{r_{\widehat{A_r^*}}}^*$.

Proof is in the paper. Empirical validation:



I.e., while $\widehat{A_r^*}$ might not be optimal, treating $\widehat{A_r^*}$ as a reward function does not worsen (or improve) performance *if* the condition above is met.

But the max of $\widehat{A_r^*}$ in every state is not generally 0.

Let g'(s, a) = g(s, a) + constant.

$$\text{Then } logistic\Big(\sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_1|-1} g(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma}) - \sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_2|-1} g(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma})\Big) = logistic\Big(\sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_1|-1} g'(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma}) - \sum_{t=0}^{|\sigma_2|-1} g'(s_t^{\sigma}, a_t^{\sigma})\Big).$$

The likelihood is not affected by arbitrary shifts, so we should generally expect that $max_a \widehat{A_r^*}(s, a) \neq 0$.

More generally, in variable horizon tasks, such constant shifts to reward can create catastrophic changes to the set of optimal policies. How can we reduce this issue?

An ameliorative tactic: include segments with transitions from absorbing state

A simple episodic MDP



Absorbing state - turns episodic tasks into continuing (infinite) ones



An ameliorative tactic: include segments with transitions from absorbing state



Results from 30 gridworld MDPs

An ameliorative tactic: include segments with transitions from absorbing state

Transitions from absorbing state push the maximum per state towards 0.



Noiselessly generated preferences

Results from the same 30 gridworld MDPs

Condition	π_r^* terminates	π_r^* does not terminate
Max loop partial return > 0	$greedy \ Q^*_{\widehat{A^*_r}}$	$greedy \ \widehat{A_r^*}$
Max loop partial return < 0	$greedy \ \widehat{A^*_r}$	$greedy \ Q^*_{r_{\widehat{A^*_r}}}$

Table 1: Hypothesis regarding which algorithm performs as well or better than the other, given 2 conditions.



Reward is also highly shaped with approximation error



Is using $\widehat{A_r^*}$ as reward advised?

No!

But it's not as bad as we would have expected (if a pitfall is addressed).

Using \widehat{A}_r^* as reward when fine-tuning LLMs with RLHF

Our hypothesis

annotators give regret-based preferences

and

engineers using fine-tuning are unknowingly applying the regret preference model

When A* is learned without error...

Optimal policies are preserved.

Reward is highly shaped.

(But with approximation error, there is one large issue.)

Fine-tuning InstructGPT (and ChatGPT)

Step 2

Collect comparison data, and train a reward model.

A prompt and several model outputs are sampled.



This data is used to train our

reward model.

A labeler ranks the outputs from best to worst.



Mapping this to the previous content

- They assume the partial return preference model.
- Segment length is 1.
- State is the full observation history.
- The next state is not in the segment and not an input to
- A ranking of n responses is turned into many preference $\hat{\mathbf{r}}$ (precisely (n²-n)/2 preferences).
- Their "reward model" is our \hat{r} :

The same approach is used for DeepMind's Sparrow (Glaese et al., 2022), Llama 2 (Touvron, 2023), and other influential work (Ziegler et al., 2019 and Bai et al.; 2022).

Ouyang et al., 2022

The multi-turn language problem



- Assumes the **partial return** preference model.
- Segment length is 1.
- Learned reward function is applied as if in a **bandit task**!!!!

On InstructGPT (Ouyang et al., 2022)

Reinforcement learning (RL). Once again following Stiennon et al. (2020), we fine-tuned the SFT model on our environment using PPO (Schulman et al., 2017). The environment is a bandit environment which presents a random customer prompt and expects a response to the prompt. Given the prompt and response, it produces a reward determined by the reward model and ends the episode.

The multi-turn language problem



But the multi-turn problem is not a bandit problem!

Partial return assumes learned function approximates *r*.

$$\pi_r^*(s) = \operatorname{argmax}_a Q_r^*(s, a)$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_a (r(s, a) + \gamma E_{s'}[V_r^*(s')])$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_a r(s, a) \longleftarrow \text{ bandit task}$$

Must assume y=0

Regret

Assumes the learned function approximates A^* . No γ hyperparameter.

$$\pi_r^*(s) = \operatorname{argmax}_a A_r^*(s, a)$$

We get the same fine-tuning algorithm with a better supported preference model and without the arbitrary assumption of γ =0!

Preference elicitation interfaces

Playground task **()** Talk to the assistant

Task 1 of 5

Comments I thought the assistant was ...

Rating

Bad

Good

Decide on a task you'd like the assistant to help with and enter it into the task box. Interact with the AI assistant. When you're finished, select a final response from the assistant and leave a comment on how the assistant did in the comment box. Click to go to the next task.

Assistant think the best topics for conversation are common t

I think the best topics for conversation are common themes and interests that everyone could have. Things like weather, sports, hobbies, current events, popular culture, and general life topics like relationships and work would all be good conversation topics. You could also have more advanced conversations discussing philosophy and morality if you want to demonstrate some higher level Al capabilities.

I have to come up with a conversation with an Al assistant for the purposes of showing it off in a demo. What sorts of conversation

🤯 Human

Human

I think I'm more interested in an advanced conversation. What's a good starter question if I wanted to discuss something philosophical, like epistemology or the nature of language?

Assistant

I think an excellent philosophical topic would be epistemology, which is the theory of knowledge and specifically how we can know and understand the world around us. A really good starting question would be something liken How can we truly know and understand the world?", or "What is the nature of knowledge?". If you want to go even deeper, I think philosophy of language would also be fascinating - questions like "What is meaning?", "How do language and shught relate?", and "How can language mislead and deceive?" would be great discussion topics.

🤯 Human

R

-

Choose the most helpful and honest response

I think a good answer to that would be that language layers us to structure our thoughts and express what we are thinking. Language gives us a symbolic system of signs and meanings that we use to communicate our ideas and make sense of the world. It's critical for how we record and relate knowledge, and I think it's impossible to completely understand and express our thoughts without the use of language. Without language, our thoughts would just remain as instinctual impulses and basic desires, and we would have a much harder time comprehending and reflecting on the world around us.

thought relate?

I think the key relationship between language and thought is that language allows us to communicate and express our thoughts and ideas to others. Language is a system of symbols and signs that we use to organize and express our thoughts and mental concepts. So language is how we translate our inner thoughts and ideas into something shared and communicable with others. Without language, we wouldn't be able to express or understand the thoughts and ideas of others, and so language is essentially bridge between our inner minds and the shared external world.

> A A A A B B B B A is better B is better

Figure 6 We show the interface that crowdworkers use to interact with our models. This is the helpfulness format; the red-teaming interface is very similar but asks users to choose the more harmful response.

Choose the most helpful and honest response

Bai et al., 2022



When segment length > 1 and $\gamma=0$, the partial return preference model nonsensically ignores all actions after the first.

• Regret results in a different algorithm that appears reasonable.

A clearer understanding will bear fruit later.

Contrastive Preference Learning: Learning from Human Feedback without RL

Joey Hejna, Rafael Rafailov, Harshit Sikchi, Chelsea Finn, Scott Niekum, W. Bradley Knox, Dorsa Sadigh



2,500 "densely" labeled trajectory segments

Common model
Partial return

$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic}\left(\sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_1} r(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_2} r(s,a)\right)$$
$$P(\sigma_1 \succ \sigma_2) = \text{logistic}\left(\sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_1} A_r^*(s,a) - \sum_{(s,a)\in\sigma_2} A_r^*(s,a)\right)$$

Proposed model Regret



Learning optimal advantage from preferences and mistaking it for reward (AAAI 2024)

The paper