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• Transitions-receive

Receive-next

New system state resulting from a receive event.

Signature

(receive-next msg systate) → new-systate

Arguments

msg — Guard (messagep msg).

systate — Guard (system-statep systate).

Returns

new-systate — Type (system-statep new-systate).

The certificate is added to the buffer of the destination validator. Recall that receive-possiblep requires the destination address to be of a correct validator.

The message is removed from the network.

Definitions and Theorems

Function: receive-next

(defun receive-next (msg systate)
  (declare (xargs :guard (and (messagep msg)
                              (system-statep systate))))
  (declare (xargs :guard (receive-possiblep msg systate)))
  (let ((__function__ 'receive-next))
    (declare (ignorable __function__))
    (b* (((certificate cert)
          (message->certificate msg))
         (dest (message->destination msg))
         ((validator-state vstate)
          (get-validator-state dest systate))
         (new-buffer (insert cert vstate.buffer))
         (new-vstate (change-validator-state vstate
                                             :buffer new-buffer))
         (systate (update-validator-state dest new-vstate systate))
         (network (get-network-state systate))
         (new-network (delete (message-fix msg) network))
         (systate (update-network-state new-network systate)))
      systate)))

Theorem: system-statep-of-receive-next

(defthm system-statep-of-receive-next
  (b* ((new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
    (system-statep new-systate))
  :rule-classes :rewrite)

Theorem: correct-addresses-of-receive-next

(defthm correct-addresses-of-receive-next
  (implies (receive-possiblep msg systate)
           (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
             (equal (correct-addresses new-systate)
                    (correct-addresses systate)))))

Theorem: validator-state->round-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->round-of-receive-next
 (implies
  (receive-possiblep msg systate)
  (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
   (equal
      (validator-state->round (get-validator-state val new-systate))
      (validator-state->round (get-validator-state val systate))))))

Theorem: validator-state->dag-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->dag-of-receive-next
 (implies
  (receive-possiblep msg systate)
  (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
   (equal
        (validator-state->dag (get-validator-state val new-systate))
        (validator-state->dag (get-validator-state val systate))))))

Theorem: validator-state->buffer-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->buffer-of-receive-next
 (implies
  (and (in val (correct-addresses systate))
       (receive-possiblep msg systate))
  (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
   (equal
    (validator-state->buffer (get-validator-state val new-systate))
    (if
     (equal val (message->destination msg))
     (insert
        (message->certificate msg)
        (validator-state->buffer (get-validator-state val systate)))
     (validator-state->buffer
          (get-validator-state val systate)))))))

Theorem: validator-state->endorsed-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->endorsed-of-receive-next
  (implies (receive-possiblep msg systate)
           (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
             (equal (validator-state->endorsed
                         (get-validator-state val new-systate))
                    (validator-state->endorsed
                         (get-validator-state val systate))))))

Theorem: validator-state->last-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->last-of-receive-next
 (implies
  (receive-possiblep msg systate)
  (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
   (equal
       (validator-state->last (get-validator-state val new-systate))
       (validator-state->last (get-validator-state val systate))))))

Theorem: validator-state->blockchain-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->blockchain-of-receive-next
  (implies (receive-possiblep msg systate)
           (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
             (equal (validator-state->blockchain
                         (get-validator-state val new-systate))
                    (validator-state->blockchain
                         (get-validator-state val systate))))))

Theorem: validator-state->committed-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->committed-of-receive-next
  (implies (receive-possiblep msg systate)
           (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
             (equal (validator-state->committed
                         (get-validator-state val new-systate))
                    (validator-state->committed
                         (get-validator-state val systate))))))

Theorem: validator-state->timer-of-receive-next

(defthm validator-state->timer-of-receive-next
 (implies
  (receive-possiblep msg systate)
  (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
   (equal
      (validator-state->timer (get-validator-state val new-systate))
      (validator-state->timer (get-validator-state val systate))))))

Theorem: get-network-state-of-receive-next

(defthm get-network-state-of-receive-next
  (b* ((?new-systate (receive-next msg systate)))
    (equal (get-network-state new-systate)
           (delete (message-fix msg)
                   (get-network-state systate)))))

Theorem: receive-next-of-message-fix-msg

(defthm receive-next-of-message-fix-msg
  (equal (receive-next (message-fix msg) systate)
         (receive-next msg systate)))

Theorem: receive-next-message-equiv-congruence-on-msg

(defthm receive-next-message-equiv-congruence-on-msg
  (implies (message-equiv msg msg-equiv)
           (equal (receive-next msg systate)
                  (receive-next msg-equiv systate)))
  :rule-classes :congruence)

Theorem: receive-next-of-system-state-fix-systate

(defthm receive-next-of-system-state-fix-systate
  (equal (receive-next msg (system-state-fix systate))
         (receive-next msg systate)))

Theorem: receive-next-system-state-equiv-congruence-on-systate

(defthm receive-next-system-state-equiv-congruence-on-systate
  (implies (system-state-equiv systate systate-equiv)
           (equal (receive-next msg systate)
                  (receive-next msg systate-equiv)))
  :rule-classes :congruence)